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SYMPOSIUM ON THE IMMUNITY OF STATE OFFICIALS 
HORIZONTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE ILC’S PROPOSED DRAFT ARTICLES ON 
THE IMMUNITY OF STATE OFFICIALS FROM FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
Chimène I. Keitner* 
The Nuremberg principles affirmed by the U.N. General Assembly1 and formulated by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) provide that “[t]he fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under 
international law acted as Head of  State or responsible Government official does not relieve him (sic) from 
responsibility under international law.”2 Few would dispute this basic principle. More contested is the question 
of  who has authority to impose consequences on individuals for international crimes committed on behalf  of  
states. This is because, if  an individual has acted with actual or apparent state authority, imposing consequences 
on the individual without her state’s consent runs counter to traditional notions of  state sovereignty and nonin-
terference.  
Principles of  sovereignty and noninterference are far from absolute. The widespread acceptance of  the re-
strictive theory of  foreign state immunity considers the commercial activities of  states to be justiciable in 
foreign courts, not because the state is any less sovereign when it acts commercially, but because the needs of  
modern commercial life require placing states on a similar footing to private actors. In other words, sovereignty 
is not an end in itself; it is only justified to the extent that it serves other goals, such as preserving international 
stability or promoting human dignity. Given the centrality of  sovereignty as an organizing principle of  interna-
tional relations, however, compromising sovereignty to promote other values requires careful consideration of  
the trade-offs involved.  
The international community’s increasing resolve to identify and punish international crimes (including war 
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity) has prompted the creation of  international tribunals to try these 
offenses. It has also spurred the enactment of  domestic legislation creating jurisdiction over certain crimes 
regardless of  the nationality of  the offender or location of  the conduct. These developments have multiplied 
the number of  jurisdictions potentially empowered to adjudicate allegations of  internationally criminal conduct, 
including conduct performed on behalf  of  states. Broadly speaking, there are three non-mutually-exclusive 
alternatives. First, an individual’s own state clearly has adjudicatory authority, although accountability must often 
 
* Harry & Lillian Hastings Research Chair and Professor of  Law at the University of  California Hastings College of  the Law. She is an Adviser on 
the ALI’s Restatement (Fourth) of  Foreign Relations Law of  the United States and co-author of  International Law Frameworks (4th ed., forthcoming 2016). 
Originally published online 14 December 2015. 
1 GA Res. 95 (I) (Dec. 11, 1946). 
2 Text of  the Nürnberg Principles Adopted by the International Law Commission, 65 UN GAOR Supp. No. 12, at 11, UN Doc. 
A/1316 (1950) reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 374, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/ADD. 1 A/CN.4/L.2 at 375 (1950). 
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await regime change (and even then is not guaranteed). Second, international tribunals created by the UN Se-
curity Council (acting under Chapter VII) or by an international treaty (with the ex ante consent of  the official’s 
own state) can serve this role. Third, foreign states can potentially enforce international law “horizontally.”3  
While the Sixth Committee of  the UN General Assembly continues to debate the scope and application of  
the principle of  universal jurisdiction,4 the ILC has been tasked with formulating principles related to immunity 
from foreign criminal jurisdiction. Both of  these projects implicate the contours of  an emerging horizontal 
enforcement regime. This contribution considers the parameters of  horizontal enforcement, and then offers 
comments on the ILC’s most recent work. 
The Role of  Horizontal Enforcement 
Horizontal enforcement is nothing new, but it has generated increased attention in recent years in light of  
efforts to use horizontal enforcement to impose consequences on individuals who have escaped investigation 
or prosecution in their home states. This phenomenon is, to some extent, a corollary of  the complementarity 
principle enshrined in the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court,5 which relies on states (including 
“non-territorial” States6) to investigate and prosecute international crimes. It also flows from the “extradite or 
prosecute” provisions of  existing multilateral treaties that criminalize conduct (such as torture) performed un-
der color of  state law.  
Ratione personae immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction protects the ability of  incumbent heads of  state 
or government, diplomats, foreign ministers, and members of  special diplomatic missions to conduct foreign 
relations.7 Ratione materiae immunity, which turns on the nature of  the act rather than the identity of  the defend-
ant, serves different goals. As noted below, ratione materiae immunity is not the only tool for avoiding the possible 
excesses of  horizontal enforcement, but its contours have figured prominently in debates about the interna-
tional legality of  prosecutions (and civil suits) against former foreign officials. (Practically speaking, the most 
effective tool for limiting the reach of  horizontal enforcement—although one that is admittedly inconvenient 
from the perspective of  a former official—is not to travel to foreign states where one risks prosecution or 
extradition.)  
Some degree of  horizontal enforcement is both necessary and desirable if  we take the idea of  personal 
responsibility for international crimes seriously. Yet, the specter of  an international jurisdictional “free for all” 
should also give us pause. Rather than defaulting to blanket immunity, we should endeavor to build a robust 
regime for imposing consequences on individuals who have engaged in egregious conduct that avoids subjecting 
former officials to foreign judicial harassment for politically unpopular decisions. Relevant factors to consider 
might include: (1) whether an international treaty would have authorized the defendant’s extradition to face 
charges for the alleged conduct; (2) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the defendant’s conduct will be 
the subject of  a genuine investigation in his or her home jurisdiction, and whether the victims will have access 
to a remedy in that jurisdiction (dismissal of  charges might even be conditioned on reassurances to that effect, 
as they are in the context of  forum non conveniens motions); and (3) whether the defendant’s alleged conduct is 
 
3 See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Germany v. Italy and the Limits of Horizontal Enforcement: Some Reflections from a U.S. Perspective, 11 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 167 (2013).  
4 General Assembly, Seventieth Session, The scope and application of  the principle of  universal jurisdiction (Agenda item 86).  
5 Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court, July 7, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90.  
6 ICC-OTP, Informal Expert Paper : The Role of  Complementarity in Practice, para. 76 (2003).  
7 See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of  11 April 2000 (Dem Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 ICJ REP. 3, 61 (Feb. 14); Prosecutor v. Taylor, 
Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, para. 41 (May 31, 2004). 
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sufficiently egregious to warrant a foreign state attaching consequences to that conduct on behalf  of  the inter-
national community as a whole (a horizontal analog of  the “gravity” requirement in the Rome Statute, which 
serves as an additional filter to limit the permissible scope of  vertical enforcement8). Procedures would need 
to be established for evaluating these factors, and one could even imagine subjecting such determinations to 
some sort of  international oversight.  
The point is that horizontal enforcement should not be, and need not be, an all-or-nothing proposition. The 
same is true of  immunity ratione materiae, despite the tendency of  commentators to frame debates about its 
contours in all-or-nothing terms.   
The Scope of  Conduct-Based Immunity 
The contours of  ratione materiae immunity from foreign criminal and civil jurisdiction remain contested. Given 
the diverse and evolving nature of  views on the subject, the ILC’s work will almost certainly involve an element 
of  “progressive development” of  the law.9 Otherwise, the ILC could end up entrenching rules that no longer 
best serve the interests of  the international community.   
The Special Rapporteur has acknowledged these concerns, noting in her Fourth Report that “States have 
repeatedly insisted that the topic of  immunity of  State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction must be 
addressed in a way that is not detrimental to or incompatible with the ongoing efforts of  the international 
community to combat impunity.”10 However, immunity is necessarily incompatible with combatting impunity. 
The question is how to balance competing values and goals. The Institut de Droit International resolved at its 
2009 Naples meeting, with Lady Hazel Fox serving as Rapporteur, that “[n]o immunity from jurisdiction other 
than personal immunity in accordance with international law applies with regard to international crimes.”11 It 
remains to be seen whether the International Law Commission will adopt a similar stance. 
The Special Rapporteur will formally consider the topic of  ratione materiae immunity for international crimes 
in her Fifth Report (due out in 2016). Even so, many observations in her Fourth Report are relevant to this 
issue, which some ILC members reportedly “consider . . . to be the very purpose, even the only purpose” of  
addressing the topic of  immunity at all.12 The structure of  the Fourth Report risks conveying the impression 
that it is possible to distill an omnivalent or omnipurpose definition of  acts taken in an “official capacity”—an 
endeavor that the ILC’s mandate might appear to invite, but that is highly problematic given the variety of  
contexts in which this concept has been invoked.13 As the Report notes, “[c]ontemporary international law does 
not provide a definition of  this type of  act,”14 and “it cannot be concluded from the [national] judicial decisions 
analyzed that a consistent pattern has been uniformly followed.”15 (The lack of  a consistent pattern might 
 
8 Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court, art 17 (1)(d)July 7, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90; see also Margaret M. deGuzman, What 
Is the Gravity Threshold for an ICC Investigation? Lessons from the Pre-Trial Chamber Decision in the Comoros Situation, 19 ASIL INSIGHTS no. 19 
(Aug. 11, 2015). 
9 International Law Commission, About the Commission, Organization, programme and methods of  work, Object of  the Commis-
sion.  
10 Int’l Law Comm’n, Fourth report on the immunity of  State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, para. 135, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/686 (2015) [hereinafter “Fourth report”].  
11 Institut de droit international, Resolution on the Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf of the 
State in case of International Crimes (2009). 
12 Fourth report, supra note 10, at para. 135. 
13 See, e.g., id. at paras. 111, 121.  
14 Id. at para. 32. 
15 Id. at para. 51. 
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suggest that an attempt at codification is premature; at the very least, such an attempt should not stifle future 
legal development.) 
Although some consider the “attributability” of  an act to the state as the sole and decisive criterion for 
whether or not such an act is covered by ratione materiae immunity from foreign civil or criminal proceedings, 
such an approach is deeply misguided. As the Fourth Report observes, the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Respon-
sibility of  States16 deliberately (and, it might be added, controversially) adopted very broad criteria for the 
attribution of  individuals’ conduct to a state.17 Mere attributability of  conduct does not make such conduct 
“official” for any purpose other than imputing responsibility to the State—a point further highlighted by the 
Fourth Report’s discussion of  the retroactive attributability to the state of  the conduct of  insurrectional move-
ments, which does not benefit from ratione materiae immunity.18 Attributability might be a necessary condition 
for invoking ratione materiae immunity, but it is certainly—and demonstrably—not sufficient.   
The focus on attribution arises from—and is often traced to—Lady Hazel Fox’s observation that  
[t]he doctrine of  the imputability of  the acts of  the individual to the State . . . in classical law . . . imputes 
the act solely to the state, who alone is responsible for its consequence. In consequence any act per-
formed by the individual as an act of  the State enjoys the immunity which the State enjoys.19 
Yet we are no longer in this “classical” period, if  it ever existed. That is because international law now rec-
ognizes that certain acts are attributable both to the individual and to the state. If  attribution does not discharge 
the individual from responsibility, it is not clear why it should nonetheless “cloak” the individual with immunity. 
The Fourth Report does a commendable job of  integrating the important concept of  dual attribution into 
its approach to ratione materiae immunity—a concept that will no doubt also figure prominently in the Fifth 
Report. The Fourth Report notes that: 
(1) The ILC “accepts the existence of  two distinct types of  responsibility that may derive from the same 
act: State responsibility and individual responsibility,”20 as evidenced by article 58 of  the Draft Arti-
cles on State Responsibility.   
(2) “[T]he principle that any act committed by an official is automatically an act of  the State and engages 
only the responsibility of  the State cannot be applied presumptively when the act is of  a criminal 
nature.”21 
(3) “[T]he immunity of  State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction ratione materiae is individual in 
nature and distinct from the immunity of  the State stricto sensu.”22 (This is not to say that individual 
and state immunity are completely unconnected; as has often been observed, functional immunity 
is for the benefit of  the state, not the individual. However, the state’s immunity and the various 
 
16 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 7, Report of  the International Law Commis-
sion on the work of  its fifty-third session, 19 UN GAOR Suppl. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001]2 Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n reprinted in 2001 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add. 1 [hereinafter “Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility”]. 
17 Fourth report, supra note 10, at para. 82. 
18 See id. at para. 116.   
19 HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 455 (2d ed. 2008). 
20 Fourth report, supra note 10, at para. 85; see also id. at para. 99. 
21 Id. at para. 101. 
22 Id. at para. 105; see also id. at para. 107. 
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immunities accorded state officials are increasingly recognized as conceptually and doctrinally dis-
tinct, even if  they are related.)  
The Fourth Report emphasizes that “any criminal act covered by immunity ratione materiae is not, strictly 
speaking, an act of  the State itself, but an act of  the individual by whom it was committed.”23 Unlike some 
other acts (such as signing a treaty, or receiving a request issued to a State to produce official documents), most 
international crimes committed by state officials give rise to both state and individual responsibility. The “dual 
attribution” model (or what the Fourth Report calls “single act, dual responsibility”24) captures this phenome-
non.  
The ILC’s Provisional Draft Articles 
Following the submission of  the Special Rapporteur’s Fourth Report, the ILC’s Drafting Committee provi-
sionally adopted several Draft Articles. Since the ILC has been tasked with studying immunity from criminal 
(rather than civil) jurisdiction, the articles provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee relate only to im-
munity from criminal jurisdiction. They include: 
(1) Draft article 2(f) of  the “Definitions” section, which provides that, for the purposes of  the proposed 
Draft Articles on the Immunity of  State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, “An ‘act per-
formed in an official capacity’ means any act performed by a State official in the exercise of  State 
authority.”25  
(2) Draft article 6(1) on the scope of  immunity ratione materiae, which provides that “State officials enjoy 
immunity ratione materiae only with respect to acts performed in an official capacity.”26 
The Drafting Committee previously adopted draft article 5 on persons enjoying immunity ratione materiae, 
which provides that “State officials acting as such enjoy immunity ratione materiae from the exercise of  foreign 
criminal jurisdiction.”27 Taken together, these articles address the “who” and the “what” of  foreign official 
immunity. 
The Drafting Committee reportedly decided to use the term “authority” rather than “function” in draft 
article 2(f) “to avoid a debate on whether the commission of  a crime could be considered as a State function.”28 
However, it seems that the ILC will not be able to avoid this debate in its Fifth Report. Anticipating this issue, 
the Fourth Report considers the argument that “an international crime can [never] be regarded as an act per-
formed in an official capacity.”29 I agree with the Special Rapporteur’s opinion that this claim, stated in 
 
23 Id. at para. 97. 
24 Id. at para. 99. 
25 Int’l Law Comm’n, Immunity of  State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, Text of  the draft articles provisionally adopted 
by the Drafting Committee at the sixty-seventh session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.865 (2015). 
26 Id. 
27 Int’l Law Comm’n, Immunity of  State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, Text of  draft articles 2 (e) and 5 provisionally 
adopted by the Drafting Committee on 15 July 2014, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.850 (2014). The Chair of  the Drafting Committee noted that 
draft article 5 might need to be revisited in light of  draft article 6(1), which does not use the expression “acting as such.” Int’l Law 
Commission, Immunity of  State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, Statement of  the Chairman of  the Drafting Committee, 
Mr. Mathias Forteau (2015) at 6. 
28 Int’l Law Commission, Immunity of  State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, Statement of  the Chairman of  the Drafting 
Committee, Mr. Mathias Forteau (2015) at 4. 
29 Fourth report, supra note 10, at para. 124. 
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categorical terms, is “at odds with the facts,”30 but this is because the term “official capacity” is too encompass-
ing to be useful in this context.  
Reducing ratione materiae immunity to an inquiry into whether or not an act was performed in an “official 
capacity” in a generic sense ends up being just as reductionist—and just as potentially misleading—as asking 
solely whether the act in question is “attributable” to a state. Concretely, this means that although state officials 
“enjoy immunity ratione materiae only with respect to acts performed in an official capacity,” they do not neces-
sarily enjoy immunity ratione materiae with respect to all such acts. As with the criterion of  attributability, acting 
in an “official capacity” is necessary but not sufficient in order for a claim of  ratione materiae immunity to block 
the horizontal imposition of  consequences on an individual alleged to have committed an international crime.    
As the European Court of  Human Rights recognized in Jones v. United Kingdom, state practice regarding the 
ratione materiae of  state officials is “in a state of  flux.”31 Some commentators have taken this as reason to deny 
the existence of  a “human rights exception” to ratione materiae immunity, based on the equation “attributability 
= official capacity = ratione materiae immunity.”32 Others have adopted the opposite view, arguing that conduct 
such as torture can never amount to an “official act” for immunity purposes.33 A third view, advanced here, 
resists a one-size-fits-all approach to immunity ratione materiae, and instead advocates calibrating such immunity 
as part of  an integrated approach to delineating the parameters of  horizontal enforcement. Whether such an 
approach is realistic given the wide range of  stakeholders and the intensity of  divergent interests remains to be 
seen. 
 
 
30 Id. 
31 Jones v. United Kingdom, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H. R. 32, 214.  
32 See, e.g., Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet’s Legacy Reassessed, 106 AJIL 731, 744 (2012). 
33 See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Is Torture an “Official” Act—Reflections on Jones v. United Kingdom (Jan. 15, 2014, 1:46 AM).  
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